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Abstract
Since the Northern disturbances of 2001 and the terrorist attacks of September 11th, the
UK government has changed the focus of policies from those that predominantly
focused on British Muslims’ Asian identity, to those that focus on British Muslims’
religious identity. The fracturing of the Asian identity has been evident in the political
discourses on the ‘war on terror’ and community cohesion, with both defining British
Muslims through their religious identity, as opposed to their Asian identity, an identity
for which inter Asian commonality existed. This article draws on research that was
conducted on British Muslims’ perceptions of social policy since the 1980s and
explores the extent to which changes in governmental policies have impacted British
Muslims’ perceptions of commonality with non-British Muslims. The article demon-
strates how the ‘war on terror’ and community cohesion are negatively impacting social
cohesion through making British Muslims feel isolated and marginalised in society.
The implications of the findings are discussed in relation to the radicalisation of British
Muslims and the growing influence of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
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Introduction
This section explores how the Northern disturbances of 2001 and the terrorist attacks of
September 11th changed the governmental policies and discourses associated with
British Muslims. Prior to the inception of community cohesion, multiculturalism was
the framework for minority communities. Multiculturalism promoted a sense of inclu-
sion through supporting minority groups [33, 39, 44] and although as Meer and
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Modood [40] note, multiculturalism has a contested meaning, in its most general sense
it advocates ethnic, cultural and religious differences being positively embraced.
Multiculturalism marked the institutionalisation of the protection of cultural, ethnic,
religious and racial groups from discrimination [34, 42]. According to Parekh [45],
within this framework the national identity should be defined in ‘politico-institutional
rather than ethnocultural terms’ so that minority groups are not excluded because of
their different ethnic identities. Although British Muslims were predominantly defined
through their ethnocultural identity, events such as the Rushdie Affair did bring British
Muslims’ religious identity into the public domain [30, 36].
British Muslims’ religious identity became increasingly prominent in 2001 when
disturbances took place in the Northern cities of Oldham, Bradford and Burnley. The
main report into the disturbances, the Cantle report was published after the events of
September 11th and this led to a greater media focus and interest in the report [41].
Following the report, the government introduced community cohesion as the new
framework for citizenship. Community cohesion defined a cohesive community as
‘having a common vision and shared sense of belonging’ ([57], p. 7) and highlighted
the need for a national identity that was based on shared values. According to Rietveld
[49], ‘the relationship between multiculturalism and national identity is presented as a
balance between diversity and unity or cohesion’. Within community cohesion, the
tension between diversity and unity was resolved through diversity being compromised
and citizens being expected to assimilate to what Fekete [21] calls, monoculturalism.
Community cohesion was not only a theoretical policy, but one which institutionalised
mechanisms such as citizenship tests, integration contracts and compulsory courses on
‘national values’ to secure unity within a shared national identity. It has been argued
that these mechanisms facilitated the securitisation of the state through conceptualising
the main threat to social cohesion as being the lack of integration by minority groups
[15, 21, 35]. Such a construction dismissed institutional racism and discrimination as
barriers to integration, thereby concealing the pervasive and detrimental impact of
structural racism in British Muslims’ daily lives.
The governmental change in policy from multiculturalism to community cohesion
has received much academic attention, with research by Moosavi [43] concluding that
although ministers have celebrated multiculturalism and diversity, they have also been
‘critical of it for preventing ‘community cohesion^. The dominant rhetoric of the then
Labour government and subsequent coalition government was to blame multicultural-
ism for segregation, communities living ‘parallel lives’ and societal ills ([13]; [48]).
Multiculturalism was also criticised for encouraging British Muslims to ‘separate
themselves and live by their own values, resulting in extremism and, ultimately, the
fostering of a mortal home-grown terrorist threat’ ([32], p. 26). Within this context, the
construction of the British Muslim community as suspect [27, 38] led to the imple-
mentation of polices in which British Muslims were stereotyped as problematic [29],
leading to the term BAsian’ ceasing to have much content as a political category’ ([42],
p. 187). The problematisation and the growing securitisation of British Muslims, as
evident through the reduction of rights and freedom of British Muslims when compared
to other communities [37] meant that emphasis was taken off real issues, such as racism
and the growth of the far right [1].
According to Castles [15], ‘multiculturalism and the ‘war on terror’ could not co-exist
as government policies’. The ‘war on terror’ accelerated many of the concepts embedded
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in community cohesion. British Muslims were stigmatised and seen as a threat, thus
legitimising the securitisation of the state through the policies of Prevent and community
cohesion [1, 40]. According to research by Alam and Husband [1], these two policies
identified British Muslim communities as ‘a threat to the British way of life’. A new
discourse on BritishMuslims emergedwherebyministers singled ‘Muslims out as inferior
and in need of being civilised’, they were associated with terrorism, fundamentalism and
extremism and this new discourse, through highlighting their religious identity separated
them from other minorities (also see [2] for a larger discussion of the construction on the
war on terror discourse). ([43], p. 9). Within this context, British identity became
increasingly defined in monolithic terms and subject to a mass process of social construc-
tion in which Britain was a victim and the erosion of civil liberties was a necessity for self-
preservation [24]. According to research byMoosavi [43], ‘ministers often suggested that
Britishness is best summed up as being about justice/the rule of law, tolerance, fairness,
democracy and freedom/liberty’. However as Kundnani [32] rightly states, many of these
values have been hugely undermined in the ‘war on terror’. Thus, as Sivanandan [52]
argues, ‘the immigrant is no longer just a classical outsider but also the terrorist within’.
According to Hussain [27], such a construction was purposeful because British Muslims
could only be questioned about loyalty and belonging if they were constructed as a
‘homogenous group’. The dual policies therefore changed the discourses associated with
British Muslims.
The ‘war on terror’ has intensified the focus on British Muslims, and within this
context it has been claimed that Islamophobia reaches ‘the highest levels of govern-
ment[s] ([16], p. 41) with governmental policies actually contributing to the existence
of Islamophobia in society ([1]; [56]). Islamophobia involves a distinction between
drawn between ‘us’ and ‘them’ and this has implications for understandings and
perceptions of group identity [1]. Within the ‘war on terror’, the deterioration of the
relationship between British Muslims and the state, and understandings and expressions
of group identity on the national level and the international level have implications for
the radicalisation process. International visits to countries including Pakistan, Palestine,
Somalia and Afghanistan have been recognised as contributing to the radicalisation of
British Muslims [19, 50]. Within this interplay between the geopolitical level and
protecting UK security, Syria is a grave concern in its capacity to radicalise British
Muslims [19]. From a security point of view, the threat of terrorism is far greater given
that a terrorist profile does not exist, and the government therefore attempts to reduce
and control established factors which are relevant to the radicalisation process [17, 25].
The factors identified include age, as just over two-thirds of all terrorist offences since
2001 have been committed by those under 30 [25], and the ‘overseas’ aspect has been
identified as a huge factor in the process of radicalisation. According to Prevent ([47],
p. 37) ‘many people from this country who have been radicalised have travelled
overseas and during that time have met and been influenced by extremist or terrorist
organisations: their travel is part of the radicalisation process’.
Perceived grievances and perceptions of injustice have also been highlighted as
factors which are relevant to the radicalisation process [47] and the government is
instrumental in the existence of such perceptions (see [4, 5]). It is vital to explore how
governmental policies are shaping understandings of group identity and possibly
reducing perceptions of commonality and unity with non-Muslims. It is also important
to have a deeper understanding of the impact of policies such as community cohesion
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and Prevent, which through predominantly focusing on British Muslims, have contrib-
uted to perceptions of injustice and grievances amongst British Muslims. This paper
presents research conducted on British Muslims’ perceptions of governmental policies
to assess the cumulative impact of the change from multiculturalism to community
cohesion. Attention is paid to how the changes in policies impacted perceptions and
understandings of group identity, and the extent to which these changes in policy have
impacted British Muslims’ perceptions of commonality with non-Muslims.
Methodology
State policy towards British Muslims has changed considerably over recent decades
with multiculturalism and community cohesion representing two very different ap-
proaches to social cohesion. The aim of the research was to explore British Muslims’
perceptions of these changes and the impact of these changes.
The research population was British Pakistani / Kashmiri Muslims in Birmingham.
32 British Muslims were interviewed using a semi structured interview format. It is
acknowledged that not all Muslims are Pakistani or Kashmiri and therefore the research
does not seek to generalise beyond this group. Birmingham was selected because it has
a large Pakistani / Kashmiri Muslim population and has been the focus of raids and
surveillance under counter terrorism legislation. All interviews were conducted during
Labour’s third term in government (which started in 2005) and prior to the Conserva-
tive / Liberal Democrat coalition government. The data is still highly relevant because
the two governmental policies of community cohesion and Prevent, which were
introduced during this period remain part of the current governmental social cohesion
and counter terrorism strategies.
Participants were recruited via a snowballing sampling strategy. Given the sensitive
nature of the research, this sampling strategy allowed individuals to base their decision to
participate on the experiences of individuals they knew had participated in the research.
Participants were given a consent form which covered confidentiality, anonymity and
participants right to withdraw at any stage of the research process. Having transcribed the
interviews, participants names were removed and replaced with pseudonyms to preserve
anonymity. Each participant was interviewed twice, once retrospectively for their percep-
tions of multiculturalism and once prospectively, for their perceptions of community
cohesion, so a total of 64 interviews were conducted. The use of retrospective interviews
and prospective interviews served the analytical purpose of enabling direct comparisons to
be made. In the retrospective interviews, questions were asked in the past tense and in the
prospective interviews, questions were asked in the present tense.
Retrospective interviewing involves participants being asked to reflect on previous
perceptions, beliefs and experiences which could in fact be shaped by contemporary
perceptions. Life history / oral history methods also involve participants being retro-
spective through discussing and sharing earlier periods of their life. Bryman [12] states
that the strength of such an approach is that the emphasis is on participant’s lives and
there is ‘a clear commitment to the processual aspects of social life, showing how
events unfold and interrelate in people’s lives’. The conducted research was similar to
research conducted by Hood and Joyce [23] which asked participants to reflect on their
changing perceptions of crime and social change in London, and research by Sin [51],
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which explored ethnic minority’s changing experiences of racism. Thompson [54]
argues that nearly all social science involves memory and memories incorporate reality.
Therefore, although there are problems associated with using data based on partici-
pants’ memories, there are also great benefits of using such data, especially when we
consider how memories form individual’s ontological reality and thus their ‘truth’.
During the interviews, participants often made reference to earlier periods of their
life and in this way the interviews were like the life story method which ‘invites the
subject to look back in detail across his or her entire life course’ ([12], p. 322). A
similar approach to that which was used by Hood and Joyce [23] was used, ‘we took
care to ask respondents to concentrate on the particular period of their life we were
investigating; to elicit narratives...... to situate their accounts in the broader context of
social relations, activities and structures’. The interviews were analysed using grounded
theory which meant that although core categories and themes could emerge, leading to
a higher level of theoretical abstraction, the categories and themes could still be traced
back to the data from which they emerged. The next section explores the main themes
to emerge in relation to participants’ perceptions of state policy before and after the
introduction of community cohesion and the terrorist attacks of September 11th (also
see [3, 4, 5] for research process of the study).
From the death of multiculturalism to community cohesion
There were vast differences between the retrospective data and the prospective
data in terms of how participants perceived state policies and the construction
of their identities within these policies. During the retrospective period, state
policies were perceived through participants’ ethnic identity and their British
identity. A common theme to emerge was perceptions of New Labour providing
services and introducing policies which focused on issues such as deprivation
and poverty, as Safia, a 26 year old woman suggests.
New Labour came in and I thought it was a change. I think they had started to
look at closing the gap; they started to look at cycles of deprivation and social
exclusion, how if you lived in the worse wards you were more likely to get the
worse education and get the worse jobs. So it was all about solutions and joining
up problems.
The existence of policies pertaining to deprivation and social exclusion
strengthened perceptions of commonality through highlighting problems which
cut across minority identities. It could therefore be argued that such policies
were perceived as inclusive policies. Although the above policies were per-
ceived as highlighting participants’ British identity, minority specific policies
were also positively perceived, as Matloob, a 35 year old man describes.
The government were very good with the Asian community, in the health
centres, in the hospitals, in the school, everywhere. The government made
it possible for us to integrate and fit in. I felt like this country was my
home and people were not scared of differences, they respected differences.
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Interestingly, and in stark contrast to the prospective data, the retrospective data showed
how the government was mainly perceived in terms of services. For example, New
Labour was perceived as providing services based on empowering ethnic minorities, as
Sophina, a 25 year old woman states.
The government was not pushing people to integrate but giving them opportuni-
ties to form their own support groups and be self productive.
The government was also recognised as providing language classes and courses
to improve social mobility. These services were perceived as positively em-
bracing participants’ ethnic / cultural identities, rather than mechanisms through
which participants were being made to assimilate.
During the retrospective interviews, participants narrated their perceptions and
experiences through their ethnic identity and their British identity and thus the identities
which were the focus of state policies. Many participants used words like ‘our’ and
‘we’ to denote their British identity, as the following quote by Shafquat, a 26 year old
man highlights (see [3] for a discussion on identities, belonging and attachment).
I was enjoying school and college with New Labour coming in. In the
90’s there was a difference, a difference that there was freedom. Things
changed in the 90’s, I really remember the 90’s, economically it was
booming, internet technology was advancing, we were experiencing a
really exciting time. You could do what you wanted and that was a result
of the government, we were allowed to do what we wanted as of when,
and I guess you can see that people in other countries did not have that
but our government provided that for us.
The state determines which identities should be the focus of policy and to what extent
rights should exist for these identities. Therefore, the state construction of identities
influences inclusion and / or exclusion [28]. Participants believed that they were
constructed according to their Asian identity and conceptualised their Asian identity
as an identity which encompassed other religious groups, such as Sikhs and Hindus as
Zara, a 42 year old woman explains.
And every now and then you would have a drama on TVabout an Asian woman
who is going to be forced to marry and it wasn’t going to work out, and she
wanted to marry someone who was white. If it was the media or the government
we were seen as Asian.
To further highlight the lack of emphasis of social policy on religious identity, when
asked if the state should have provided protection against religious discrimination,
participants cited wanting such legislation due to equality, rather than wanting the
legislation because their religious identity was being demonised, as the following quote
by Sharfquat, a 26 year old man suggests.
Within this so-called democracy every person should have the right regardless of
what religion and beliefs they have, to be protected.
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The data is highly significant because the emphasis on equality suggests that it
is essential that the state maintains equality and where principles of equality do
exist, be it at the service level or the legislative level, then a shared sense of
commonality is much more likely.
Research by Modood and Ahmad [42] revealed that British Muslims are pro-
multiculturalism as long as it includes faith as a positive dimension of difference.
Many participants felt that the state included their religious identity where services were
concerned, as Sikander, a 35 year old man explains.
This government was approving state funded Islamic schools; some discrimina-
tion legislation actually did seem to suggest that this was a country that was not
tolerant of racism. So I think in the first four or five years, there was a shift in
positively funding activity around cohesion and working with respecting the
rights of minority communities.
Where racism was concerned, the state was perceived as trying to maintain equality and
encourage society to share a British identity but not at the expense of diversity. This can
be seen when Blair [7] stated, ‘Christians, Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs and other
faiths have a perfect right to their own identity and religion, to practice their faith and to
conform to their culture. This is what multicultural, multi-faith Britain is about’. Such
sentiments, which were espoused in multiculturalism led participants such as Nasrin, a
25 year old woman to have faith in the state.
There was this constant talk of multiculturalism and this concept was not only
talked about but done so with a sense of proudness in the government, the media
and everywhere really. It was felt that living in a country full of diversity was
good, with every group having its rightful place and being appreciated.
During this period participants talked about how they associated freedom with their
religious identity, as Matloob, a 35 year old man describes.
No a law wasn’t needed because we could practice our religion, we could do
more or less what we wanted. We could open up a mosque; we could open up a
charity. There was a lot of easiness towards us and that was nice, it was like we
belonged to this society. Like we were part of this society and society accepted us,
we didn’t feel like we were segregated and if I wanted to open a charity or help
someone who is an orphan in a village back home, you know I didn’t have a
problem, I could do that.
A small minority of participants were critical of the state and although the positive
perceptions heavily outweighed the negative perceptions, it is worth including the
negative perceptions. There were some criticisms of measures to tackle institutional
racism, as Nazim, a 31 year man describes.
The Commission of Racial Equality could have executed its power better and
provided individuals with a lot more support and highlighted the ways in which it
can assist ethnic minorities.
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For some participants the Commission of Racial Equality was perceived as a tokenistic
organisation, as were policies to encourage a more representative government. Al-
though the state was generally seen as trying to eradicate racism through the introduc-
tion of anti-racism legislation, racism was still perceived in society, as the next quote by
Sumerya, a 25 year old woman highlights.
It’s when I was a teenager hanging around in the town centre a few old white men
were sitting on the bench and they were like you half breed and that and I said I’m
not a half breed, I’m a Paki so if you are going to call me something, call me what
I am. I guess that was their way of being racist.
There was also a belief that the state could have done more to tackle societal racism
through encouraging the police to investigate racism. Deutsch [20] states that relative
deprivation is critical in stimulating dissatisfaction and ‘the greater the magnitude of
relative deprivation, the greater the sense of injustice that will be experienced by the
oppressed’. Where negative perceptions of the state did exist, a great deal of inequality
was not perceived, and this is because the state was not perceived to have failed the
British Muslim community in particular, but all ethnic minorities, as the issues which
participants felt the state could have improved on were issues that impacted all ethnic
minorities. Therefore, it could be argued that had inequality been perceived through
participants’ religious identity, an identity for which inter minority commonality does
not exist, then a greater sense of deprivation would have been perceived.
Community cohesion and the institutionalisation of the Muslim other
This section considers participants’ perceptions of the state following the introduction
of community cohesion. Interestingly, all participants believed that the state facilitated
and contributed to the demonisation of Islam following the Northern disturbances and
the terrorist attacks of September 11th. Sikander, a 35 year old man highlights how the
demonisation of Islam was perceived as being state instigated, with the emergence of a
vocabulary in which Islam was negatively constructed.
In my own little world that’s called my mind, there is a conspiracy theory which
says the people who are portraying Muslims the way they are being portrayed,
with the hatred about Islam and the ideological beliefs of Islam, doesn’t exactly
translate to those who live on the estates of Kings Norton, they are just racist
through ignorance. The language is ambiguous, on the one hand they are talking
about the legislation to protect Muslims, on the other hand you have the terror
raids and then you have the ministers and members of Parliament both from the
government and opposition who are quite happy to go on national television and
make statements that would have never been accepted before 9/11.
Wetherell [57] comments on how the categorisation of a community from an external
agency has implications for how the community defines itself. The prospective data
demonstrates how participants’ religious identity became their primary identity, and
unlike the retrospective data, where the state was generally perceived as bringing
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equality and eradicating racism, in the prospective data the state was perceived as
making Islamophobia legitimate and as giving far right groups legitimacy. Participants
believed that the state had successfully created British Muslims as a separate entity to
other minority groups through associating terrorism with Islam, as Sophia, a 30 year
old woman explains.
After September 11th the government handled the attacks very well and there was
an effort to try and separate the terrorists from Muslims. However, I think this
was short lived and the separation did not happen.
Interestingly, when analysing speeches by politicians there is evidence to suggest that
politicians did create a discourse in which Islam was associated with terrorism. For
instance, Blair [8] said ‘the terrorists base their ideology on religious extremism – and
not just any religious extremism, but a specifically Muslim version’. On another
occasion he constructed Islam as being in direct opposition to British values saying,
‘it is a global fight about global values; it is about modernisation, within Islam and
outside of it; it is about whether our value system can be shown to be sufficiently
robust, true, principled and appealing that it beats theirs’ [9].
All participants explained how they believed their religious identity had been created
as a separate category with inter commonality eradicated and been re-defined according
to the ‘war on terror’ discourse. Interestingly, the state was not just perceived as
creating a negative discourse around Islam, but it was also seen as creating an intra
Muslim divide with those thought to be more religious, stereotyped as constituting a
bigger threat, as Nabeela, a 50 year woman explains.
I think the government is just crap, they don’t know what they are doing, and they
are inadequate. It’s a combination of the war and September 11th, foreign policy
and there are other issues around as well. The government is placing all the
emphasis on Muslims, saying Muslims should be doing this and they should be
doing that, but it’s about stereotypes as well, and I think that is the biggest
problem. Anyone with a beard or a hijab is seen as a threat which is just not true
and it’s about stereotyping. The government has created a divide, before we were
seen as Asian people but now we are seen as Muslims.
The connection between religious clothing and terrorism was actually made explicit
with Harman [22] stating; the veil ‘is about radicalisation and solidarity with commu-
nity. But I don’t want people to show solidarity by [wearing] something that prevents
them taking their full role as women in society’. It could therefore be argued that the
government effectively separated British Muslims from British Asian non-Muslims,
and within the new discourse surrounding British Muslims, a hierarchy was constructed
whereby characteristics, such as increased religiosity were created as characteristics that
signify threat and risk. Following 9/11, differences were amplified and this acted to
oppress British Muslims through inventing a ‘war on terror’ construction of their
religious identity. Many participants believed that where institutional racism was
concerned, the state was still concerned with eradicating racial and ethnic forms of
racism. However, where racism against British Muslims was concerned, participants
believed the state was institutionalising Islamophobia.
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A strong discourse emerged in which British Muslims were not seen as integrating,
with Blair [10] stating, ‘people want to know that the Muslim community in particular,
but actually all minority communities, have got the balance right between integration
and multiculturalism’. Segregation was predominantly seen as ‘a Muslim problem’
with Straw [53] arguing, ‘the trend towards greater segregation is most marked in some
areas with large Asian, principally Muslim populations’. However, perhaps the most
concerning part of this discourse was that British Muslims were constructed as being
incompatible with and as a threat to British values, with Brown [11] stating, ‘for too
long we overvalued what makes us different, it is time to also value what we believe in
common a shared national purpose for our country’ and Kelly [31] arguing that young
British Muslims should be encouraged ‘to identify and live by the shared British values
of justice, peace and respect’. It was therefore strongly being suggested that British
Muslims’ religious identity was stopping them from living according to British values.
Deutsch [20] states that civilised oppression emerges when the state enforces rules
and procedures which regulate the social institutions of the society and produce
inequality. All participants believed that after the Northern disturbances and September
11th, Islamophobia existed in all institutions, thus making the term civilized oppression
relevant. State created policies and legislation were perceived as having created
institutional Islamophobia and as participants described, as making institutions racist.
This top down form of racism was also noted as being different to societal racism, as
Jangir, a 21 year old man explains.
Now it has become more overt and the sophistication has been lost when you’ve
got people like John Reid, some kind of thug inside the Home Office, and he’s
coming out with stupid comments, and its increased in a bad way because now
it’s a more sophisticated kind of racism, and that is a lot harder to fight.
The data reveals how participants perceived the state to have shaped the social meaning
associated with their religious identity. Through institutionalising Islamophobia and
creating structural inequality, participants believed the state had created British Mus-
lims as being different and distinct to other minorities. All participants referred to and
defined the state according to the power it has to introduce legislation and further,
related the institutionalisation of Islamophobia predominantly to the criminal justice
system. Many participants felt the that state had not only introduced legislation, which
has produced concerns regarding human rights but also created an Islamophobic police
force, as Nazar, a 44 year old man explains.
Since 9/11 things have changed, the government has changed its policies and
views of Muslims. Through policy and legislation, the government has placed
restrictions on Muslims and these have been rampant. I would say that the most
destructive way in which they are being aggressive and now targeting all the
Muslim community is through the police and this is making the force more racist
towards Muslims.
When analysing speeches by politicians, terrorism was created as representing a huge
threat and risk. For example, Blair [6] stated that the threat is ‘real and existential’ and
needs to be fought ‘whatever the political cost’. The counter terrorism measures
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introduced were aggressive and criticised by the House of Lords. ‘Since September 11th
2001 the Government has continuously justified many of its counter-terrorism mea-
sures on the basis that there is a public emergency threatening the life of the nation. We
question whether the country has been in such a state for more than eight years. This
permanent state of emergency inevitably has a deleterious effect on public debate about
the justification for counter-terrorism measures’ [26]. Further, the threat and risk of
terrorism was seen as being dispersed, with Clarke [18] stating ‘extremists can be found
in training camps, in prisons, in bookshops, or in places of worship’. These quotes from
politicians clearly highlight how terrorism was constructed. It was therefore not
surprising to find that participants believed that this discourse shaped their interactions
with British non-Muslims at the societal level. Participants believed that phrases like
‘enemy within’ and ‘mainstream society’ acted to not only represent the magnitude of
the terrorist threat, but also led to the marginalisation and exclusion of British Muslims
at the societal level. The demonsisation of British Muslims was seen as leading to a
complete curtailment of human rights, as Mazar, a 50 year old man explains.
I think it is very fundamentalist and doesn’t like to do pleasurable things, doesn’t
like art and doesn’t like music, out to become some sort of fighter or some sort of
suicide bomber, it’s those kinds of negative Jihadist as they call it, and out to do
damage to the mainstream society and this is the real distinction now and
remember, this is very different from previous discrimination which was based
on difference and fear of difference and here it’s based on a belief that Muslims
are out to destroy mainstream society and it’s far more malicious and far more
harmful because people can do things to Muslims and not worry about human
rights and civil rights and all that. If you demonise them enough then it’s
acceptable to treat them differently and that’s the real thing. You can justify the
curtailment of human rights based on ones faith and the way they look and this
has parallels with the way Nazi Germany treated the Jewish people, they
demonised them enough and made them appear as a problem and then massive
harm was done to them, and I see some parallels with that and the Muslim
community.
Conclusion
Equality was found to be a dominant theme in the research. In the retrospective period,
where negative perceptions of the state did exist, a great deal of inequality was not
perceived because the state was not perceived to have failed British Muslims but all
ethnic minorities. This suggests that where state inequality or racism is perceived for a
shared minority identity, this decreases perceptions of inequality. The importance of
diversity was also demonstrated because in the retrospective period, where rights
existed for a variety of identities, British, ethnic and religious, this led to positive
perceptions of the state.
Although the state adopted community cohesion, a policy which created a discourse
incorporating British identity, the research demonstrates how participants’ perceptions
of being part of this identity were very complex. Community cohesion was found to be
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an abstract policy which in fact, other than introducing concepts of shared citizenship
and promoting these as the ideals which unite citizens, actually did very little to make
participants feel British. Therefore, in terms of the future relationship between the state
and British Muslims, it is important that the state recognises that policies which are
based on minority identities, when perceived negatively can have an impact which
transcends to such severe feelings of exclusion, that such marginalisation cannot be
remedied through the introduction of other policies aimed at achieving unity, such as
community cohesion.
When considering the more intricate ways in which the state has marginalised
British Muslims, the introduction of counter terrorism legislation was instrumental in
shaping such perceptions. Anger existed because the state failed to highlight the
diversity of British Muslims and instead, homogenised the Islamic faith and associated
British Muslims with terrorism. This suggests that although policies are important in
terms of conveying citizens’ identities, the words used by politicians and those that
comprise the state are also important. Where politicians circulate discourses through the
media, language should reflect commonality. There should be an acknowledgement
that British Muslims are also victims in the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘war on terror’ is not
merely a ‘Muslim problem’. The state can only expect British Muslims to perceive
commonality and therefore feel British, if it is willing to create the structural conditions
and discourses within which British Muslims commonality is highlighted.
Perceptions by British Muslims that they represent and are a separate entity will
increase the power and legitimacy of the narratives used by groups such as Al Qa’ida
and ISIS. Generally, the term single narrative is ‘used to refer to the particular
interpretation of religion, history and politics that is associated with Al Qa’ida and
like-minded groups. The narrative connects ‘grievances’ at a local and/or global level
reinforces the portrayal of Muslims as victims of Western injustice and thereby purports
to legitimise terrorism. It combines fact, fiction, emotion and religion and manipulates
discontent about local and international issues’ ([47], p. 108). Terrorism, radicalisation
and community cohesion all involve the politicisation of identity, and although the
global extremist narrative may involve the use of global grievances, it is important that
perceptions of global grievance are not combined with perceptions of national griev-
ances. The growing sense of marginalisation and isolation of British Muslims raises
concerns for radicalisation. The research clearly demonstrates that if British Muslims
are to be cohered into the British state, as the policy of community cohesion aims, then
wider ‘war on terror’ policies need to stop marginalising British Muslims. The two
discourses of community cohesion and the ‘war on terror’ have combined to create a
discourse in which Islam and Muslim identity are constructed as a threat to British
values. The ‘war on terror’ discourse is a very powerful divisive discourse. Given the
findings of this research, it seems plausible to suggest that the state is in denial about
the role of their own policies in isolating British Muslims to such an extent that they no
longer feel British.
The value of this research is the fact that it covers over two decades, and from doing
so, it is evident that British Muslims did feel an overwhelming sense of inclusion, and
this was primarily because the state facilitated such inclusion through policies. It was
the emphasis on British, in actual policies which impacted participants’ lives and
assisted in achieving perceived unity. When analysing the data, it is the shift from
concrete policies, (such as those aimed at deprivation which made participants identify
592 Ahmed S.
with other British non-Muslims citizens) to a set of abstract policies around Britishness
that have harmed social cohesion. According to the research, it is the Muslim in British
Muslim which now shapes the concrete policies which govern British Muslims’ lives.
Therefore, if British Muslims are to have a stronger sense of identification which their
British identity, it is essential that the state facilitates the conditions whereby they
experience the same policies as British non-Muslims.
However, given the growth of exclusionary policies over the last decade, especially
those pertaining to the Brexit ‘Leave Campaign’, it is hard to argue that divisive policies
solely exist through counter terrorism policies. Xenophobia was inherent to the con-
structed cultural, social and economic threat of immigration pre and post Brexit [46].
Although ethnic racism was largely accepted as having been replaced with cultural
racism by the 1990s, the increase of hate crimes and racial violence against ethnic
minorities, media stigmatisation of minorities, and the dispersion of far-Right dis-
courses of Britishness within mainstream society, have made post Brexit Britain a
place of hostility [14, 55]. It could therefore be argued that given the post Brexit
climate, there are far more policies which are acting to diminish perceived commonality
between ethnic minorities and non-ethnic minority British citizens. This research has
relevance to our understanding of the role of policies in shaping perceptions. Through
providing empirical evidence to demonstrate the impact of divisive social policies on
British Muslims and social cohesion, it is possible to grasp the destructive influence
and impact of divisive policies such as the Brexit campaigns on ethnic minorities. And
whereas this paper has focused on British Muslims, it could be argued that given the
increase of divisive policies such as Brexit, a growing number of minority groups are
experiencing exclusion on the basis of their religious identity and their ethnic identity.
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